Occupational choice and the quality of entrepreneurs by İnci, Eren & Inci, Eren






This paper focuses on the quality of entrepreneurs when individuals, who di¤er in
terms of entrepreneurial ability and wealth, choose between entrepreneurship and
wage-earning. A loan is required to become an entrepreneur. Four wealth classes
form endogenously. Banksinability to identify the ability of individuals leads them
to o¤er pooling contracts to the poor and the lower-middle classes. Regardless of
ability, all poor class individuals become workers and all lower-middle class indi-
viduals become entrepreneurs. Banks are able to o¤er separating contracts to the
upper-middle and the rich classes. High-ability individuals in these wealth classes
become entrepreneurs and their low-ability counterparts become workers. Equilib-
rium contracts may entail cross-subsidies within or between occupations. In some
economies, a small success tax on entrepreneurs used to subsidize workers can in-
crease the average quality of entrepreneurs and welfare by changing the thresholds
of the wealth classes. In some others a reverse policy is required. Since the ag-
gregate level of investment is xed, the reason for these policies is not under- or
overinvestment by entrepreneurs, as it often is in previous literature.
Keywords: adverse selection; entrepreneurship; general equilibrium contract the-
ory; moral hazard; occupational choice; success tax; wage subsidy
JEL Classication: D43; D82; H25; L26
Tel.: 90-216-483-9340; fax : 90-216-483-9250. Address: Sabanci University - FASS, Orhanli / Tuzla
34956 Istanbul TURKEY. E-mail address: ereninci@sabanciuniv.edu. I am grateful to David de Meza,
Avinash Dixit, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Tomas Sjostrom, Hi-Lin Tan, the dissertation workshop participants
at Boston College (2005, 2005, 2006, 2006), session participants at the CEBR Conference on Entre-
preneurship: Occupational Choice and Financing (2006), the Cambridge-MIT Institute Workshop on
Regional Innovation (2006), the European Meeting of the Econometric Society (2006), seminar partici-
pants at the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) (2006), the University of Aberdeen (2007),
Bilkent University (2007), Sabanci University (2007), the Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration (2007), Georgia Institute of Technology (2007), the University of Mannheim (2006, 2007),
Boston University (2006), and especially James Anderson, Richard Arnott, Susanto Basu, and Andrew
Newman for helpful comments. Some of the ideas presented here were developed while I was attending
three NBER Entrepreneurship Group Meetings in 2005. This research is nancially supported by the
Paula and Daniel Greeley Award and the Boston College Dissertation Fellowship Award. The travel
grants given by the NBER Entrepreneurship Group and the Cambridge-MIT Institute are also gratefully
acknowledged. All errors are mine.
1
1 Introduction
It is already well known that entrepreneurship has an enormous e¤ect on the performance
of an economy. In most countries, this fact is commonly reected in policy in the form
of subsidies aimed at increasing the number of entrepreneurs. Yet what guarantees that
the individuals who become entrepreneurs as a result of these policies will be produc-
tive entrepreneurs rather than unproductive or destructive ones? As is well-documented
by Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), the misallocation of talent
is a rather robust phenomenon across time and space. Most cross-sectional data avail-
able if not all on entrepreneurs show that GDP per capita is quite unrelated to the
number of entrepreneurs per capita.1 Moreover, Blanchower (2000) shows that a higher
number of entrepreneurs is not necessarily associated with higher growth rates in OECD
countries, and Blanchower (2004) indicates more may not be better.Combining all
of these results with the stigma of failure reported all over the world, it is obvious that
entrepreneurship is a matter of quality more than a matter of quantity. It is this quality
problem that this paper focuses on. It is easy to make individuals entrepreneurs but
di¢ cult to nd the good ones. Markets often prevent some high-ability individuals (in
terms of entrepreneurial abilities) from pursuing entrepreneurship while they encourage
some low-ability individuals to become entrepreneurs. How can the government increase
the average quality of entrepreneurs, and thus improve the performance of the economy?
Could it be possible to do so even though the government does not know who are the
high-ability and low-ability individuals?
I focus on a simple occupational choice problem in which there are two types of agents
who di¤er in terms of unobservable entrepreneurial abilities, referred to as high-type and
low-type agents. Agents also di¤er with respect to their wealth (which is liquid and
observable by banks). They face a decision whether to become entrepreneurs or workers.
There are two further links between entrepreneurship and wage-earning besides one being
the outside option of the other. First, entrepreneurs hire workers. Second, the wealth
endowments of the workers are lent to entrepreneurs in the nancial markets. In the
presence of such interlinkages in a general equilibrium setting, it is less clear ex ante
whether creating disincentives in one occupation would create better outcomes economy-
wide and in that occupation. Indeed, this paper shows that in some economies but
not in all  a tax on entrepreneurs used to subsidize workers can increase the average
quality of entrepreneurs in the economy. That is, the common practice of subsidizing
entrepreneurs might not work.
If agents decide to become entrepreneurs, they have to borrow from banks since their
wealth alone is not enough to fully nance their rms. Every agent has the same proba-
bility of success in entrepreneurship, but high-type agents may increase this probability
by working hard. When the net present value of the projects of low-type agents is negative
1For example, the data from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Acs, et al., 2005; GEM hereafter)
shows that there are countries with similar levels of entrepreneurial activities yet with quite di¤erent
GDP levels (such as Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Canada United States, Norway, and Switzerland). There
are also relatively poor countries with various levels of entrepreneurial activities (such as South Africa,
Argentina, Brazil, Jamaica, and Venezuela). Incorporating di¤erent denitions of entrepreneurship (i.e.,
nascent entrepreneurship, new, established, or total number of business owners) does not change the
dispersed gure. Table 1 in Gollin (forthcoming), which is based on the Penn World Tables and the
International Labor Organization Yearbook, and the self-employment data from OECD for any year also
reect similar dispersed scatter plots.
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but that of high-type agents who provide e¤ort is positive, low-type agents would have no
incentive to apply for loans in a perfect world. In an imperfect world, however, they may
try to get loans because of the cross-subsidization in the loan market triggered by adverse
selection. Equilibrium requires that entrepreneurs self-nance their rms with their own
wealth as much as possible and borrow the rest from banks. All loanable funds come from
those who become workers. Thus, the number of entrepreneurs is simply the aggregate
wealth available in the economy divided by the xed capital requirement to start a rm.
This implies that the number of entrepreneurs in the economy is xed, which allows me
to explore the e¤ects of policies on the quality of the entrepreneurs alone.
The paper rst derives the contracts o¤ered by banks and analyzes the decisions of the
agents in a partial equilibrium when the factor prices are given. Di¤erent equilibrium
contracts emerge in every wealth level as a result of the assumption that the wealth is
observable by banks. The contractual structure endogenously forms four di¤erent wealth
classes in the society: the poor, the lower-middle, the upper-middle, and the rich.
Banks have no choice but to o¤er pooling contracts to the poor and the lower-middle
classes since it is always benecial for low-type members of these wealth classes to mis-
represent themselves as high-type agents. A pooling contract requires that high-type
agents cross-subsidize low-type agents in the loan market. The fact that only pooling
contracts can be o¤ered in these wealth classes a¤ects the occupational structure in dif-
ferent ways. In the poor class, it distorts the occupational decisions downward by isolating
high-type agents from the loan market, and thus, from entrepreneurship. The reason is
that high-type agents in this class are so poor that they cannot both provide e¤ort in
entrepreneurship and also cross-subsidize low-type agents in the loan market. Knowing
this, banks set the interest rate high enough so that none of the agents in the poor class
will prefer to apply for loans. Hence, all poor class agents, whether high- or low-type,
become workers. However, in the lower-middle class, the pooling contracts distort occu-
pational decisions upward by allowing the low-type agents to become entrepreneurs. On
the one hand, high-type agents in this wealth class can provide e¤ort in entrepreneurship
even though they have to cross-subsidize low-type agents in the loan market; on the other
hand, cross-subsidies make loans attractive to low-type agents. As a result, both high-
and low-type agents prefer becoming entrepreneurs in the lower-middle class.
In the upper-middle wealth class, banks can o¤er separating contracts that limit prices the
loans. Thus, low-type agents become workers and high-type agents become entrepreneurs
in this wealth class. There is still cross-subsidization even though separating contracts are
o¤ered, but now it is in the form of information rents between the occupations. That is,
the fact that the types cannot be observed causes transfers from high-type entrepreneurs to
low-type workers. However, these information rents are e¢ cient since they do not distort
the occupational decisions, and hence do not a¤ect who can use the capital. Finally, banks
o¤er rst-best e¢ cient separating contracts to the rich class agents. Rich low-type agents
need to borrow much less to start their rms, and thus, they do not benet much from
wrongfully revealing their types to be able to get loans. Hence, even a rst-best e¢ cient
contract is incentive-compatible in this wealth class, and as a result, rich low-type agents
become workers while their high-type counterparts become entrepreneurs.
After determining the equilibrium contracts and decisions of agents, I show that the
equilibrium characterized in this partial equilibrium can exist in a general equilibrium,
and then I present a policy exercise in that setting when the labor and the credit markets
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are interlinked. This analysis demonstrates how a small tax on entrepreneurs used to
subsidize workers may increase the average quality of the pool of entrepreneurs in the
economy by changing the boundaries of the wealth classes. The intuition goes as follows.
Although the tax-subsidy policy a¤ects all agents, its magnitude varies in di¤erent groups.
In the economies on which I focus, the policy restructures the incentive schemes in the
markets in such a way that agents who switch from entrepreneurship to wage-earning
as a result of the policy are relatively wealthier than agents who do the opposite. This
increases the loan supply to the banks, and thus, decreases the risk-free interest rate. The
decrease in the risk-free interest rate equal to the cost of loanable funds also means a
decrease in the lending interest rate.
Cross-subsidization in the loan market is the only reason why low-type agents may be
attracted to entrepreneurship. Therefore, they prefer becoming entrepreneurs only if a
su¢ ciently large portion of their projects is nanced by banks. A decrease in the lending
interest rate decreases the cross-subsidies per unit of loan borrowed by low-type agents.
This mitigates the distortions of the adverse selection by discouraging some low-type
agents from becoming entrepreneurs. Those who change their occupational decisions
from entrepreneurship to wage-earning are low-type agents with greater wealth in the
lower-middle class. Since there is a xed number of entrepreneurs in the economy, the
entrepreneurship positions emptied by them must be lled by some other agents. Who
would they be? When the lending interest rate decreases, some of the poor high-type
agents who used to be isolated from the loan market because they could not provide
e¤ort in entrepreneurship are now able to do so, and thus, banks can provide loans to
them. However, when they become entrepreneurs, their low-type counterparts can also
become entrepreneurs as a result of the pooling contracts o¤ered in the lower-middle
class. Thus, the overall e¤ect of the policy is to swap some lower-middle class low-type
entrepreneurs with an equal number of poor class high- and low-type workers. Given a
xed pool of entrepreneurs, the average quality of the entrepreneurs in the economy has
to increase, and so does the welfare.
The model exhibits some empirical regularities, such as the fact that entrepreneurship is
high in the countries where wages are higher, or the well-known fact that higher (lower)
wages are associated with developed (developing) countries. It also shows at least one
reason why policies for promoting entrepreneurship should be tailored to a countrys
specic context as indicated in the GEM. The GEM suggests a "one size does not t all"
policy. For example, low-income nations need to increase family income before focusing
exclusively on entrepreneurs. I show that the market failures in the credit market distort
the economy only in the poor and the lower-middle classes. Since relatively more people
live in these wealth classes in poor countries, the problems in the entrepreneurial sectors
hit the poor nations more than the rich ones. As individuals accumulate wealth and move
up in the wealth distribution, adverse selection either turns into an e¢ cient information
rent (as in the upper-middle class) or completely disappears (as in the rich class). This
helps shed light on why entrepreneurial sectors improve in the later phases of economic
development.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief comparison of this paper
with the current literature on entrepreneurship. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
focuses on the partial equilibrium in the credit market. Section 5 extends the analysis to
a general equilibrium. Section 6 explores the e¤ects of success taxes and wage subsidies.
Section 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A contains derivations of some of the contracts
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and Appendix B contains some of the proofs.
2 Literature Review
The literature on the economic theory of entrepreneurship has grown rapidly in the recent
years. Here, I shall conne myself to a selection of papers that are closely relevant to mine.
The idea behind this paper is motivated by de Meza and Webb (2000) who show that
sometimes the most e¤ective policy is to subsidize the (exogenous) outside option to
entrepreneurship.
A long strand of papers questions if the aggregate level of investment by entrepreneurs
is too high or too low in the partial equilibrium. Perhaps the most famous of these are
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987). When the cost of loanable funds
is exogenous, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) (and its successors) argues that lending interest
rates can be ine¢ ciently high, and if so, aggregate investment will be ine¢ ciently low.
This calls for a subsidy to entrepreneurship. On the other hand, de Meza and Webb
(1987) (and its successors) shows that under other plausible assumptions there can be
excessive lending to entrepreneurs, and thus, overinvestment in the aggregate. This calls
for a tax on entrepreneurship. However, when the cost of loanable funds is endogenous,
insu¢ cient or excessive lending is not an issue since the aggregate level of investment is
xed. Thus, the tax/subsidy policy in my paper increases welfare for a di¤erent reason
than that of an overinvestment (or underinvestment) problem in the aggregate. Instead,
it works by improving the quality composition of entrepreneurs in the economy.
Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjostrom (forthcoming)2 develops another occupational choice model
in which the labor and credit markets are interlinked and provide another reason why a tax
on entrepreneurs might be desirable. In its base model, a tax on entrepreneurs is always
desirable and since the risk-free interest rate is exogenous, the main channel through which
the policy works is the adjustment in the labor demand and its repercussions for the rest of
the economy. I endogenize the risk-free interest rate by taking workers to be the source of
loanable funds. The policy in my model changes the wealth class thresholds endogenously
and it works through an adjustment to the loan supply to the banks, which in turn a¤ects
the risk-free interest rate in the economy. Moreover, a tax on entrepreneurs is not always
desirable in my model; it depends on the economic environment of the economy, such as
its wealth distribution. Below I argue why I believe that the risk-free interest rate can
adjust as a result of changes in occupational structure. The credit market is also modeled
di¤erently in my paper. In the screening section of GMS, banks can make positive prots
with separating contracts. However, in my setting there is no positive prot for banks
in equilibrium, because banks can deviate to a cross-subsidizing separating contract via
which the low-type agents are paidnot to become entrepreneurs. GMS does not allow
for this kind of a contract. In that sense, in GMS, there is a direct e¤ect of wage increase:
with a higher outside option it becomes easier to separate high-type agents from low-
type agents. In contrast, in my paper, banks do not need government intervention since
they themselves can raise the outside option on their own by o¤ering cross-subsidizing
contracts.3
2GMS hereafter.
3I thank Tomas Sjostrom for pointing out this di¤erence.
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One common assumption in the literature is that loans are innitely supplied, possibly
from international markets (see, for example, GMS, and de Meza and Webb (1987, 2000)).
This means that the cost of funds to the banks, equal to the risk-free interest rate, is xed.
This partial analysis can be a good approximation when the entrepreneurial sector of the
economy is relatively small and occupational choices do not have much e¤ect on the factor
prices (the risk-free interest rate and wages), which might happen in the short-run. My
focus is the long-run, as it should be for a policy analysis. In my general equilibrium
model, the occupational choices do a¤ect the factor prices. The evidence in support of
this argument is reported by Reynolds and White (1997): by the end of their working
lives, about 2/5 of the U.S. workforce have had at least one spell of self-employment,
which is quite enough to a¤ect the factor prices in the long-run. Even for small open
economies, the occupational decisions of agents can a¤ect factor prices in the long-run,
owing to imperfect nancial markets and limited lending to any specic country. Indeed,
despite the globalization movements in recent decades, the Feldstein and Horioka Puzzle
(1980) which presents the empirical regularity that the long-run average of national
savings is highly correlated to domestic investment remains one of the six major puzzles
in international macroeconomics (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000).
The paper is related to Parker (2003) which explores various tax policies regarding entre-
preneurship (in particular di¤erential tax treatment of occupations) in an imperfect credit
market model in which ability applies both to entrepreneurship and wage-earning. The
paper is also related to Gruner (2003), which nds that ex ante complete redistribution
of endowments may lead to Pareto improvement by increasing the risk-free interest rate.
However, in my setting, the small tax-subsidy policy is in the ex post sense and works by
decreasing the risk-free interest rate. There is also a huge body of papers on occupational
choice on which this paper builds on such as Banerjee and Newman (1993), Lloyd-Ellis
and Bernhardt (2000), Ghatak, Morelli, and Sjostrom (2001), and Mookherjee and Ray
(2002).
3 The Model
I consider a one-period closed economy with many principals (banks) and many agents
(individuals). Agents decide whether to become entrepreneurs (denoted by E) or workers
(denoted by W ).
3.1 Economic environment
There are (at least two) banks (indexed by z) and a unit mass of agents (indexed by i).
Agents are composed of h high types and 1   h low types. They are assumed to be risk
neutral, and hence, maximize their expected income by choosing their occupations. The
type of an agent a¤ects his payo¤ from entrepreneurship, but all agents are identical in
terms of their abilities in wage-earning. Low-type agents succeed in entrepreneurship with
probability pL. High-type agents, on the other hand, have two options. They may either
provide e¤ort or shirk. If they provide e¤ort they can increase their success probability
to pH , but this comes with an e¤ort cost of e > 0. If they shirk their success probability
is pL and, hence, is the same as the success probability of low-type agents. Providing
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e¤ort is prohibitively costly for low-type agents. Hereafter, high-type agents who choose
to provide e¤ort are denoted by H, and low-type agents and high-type agents who choose
to shirk are denoted by L.
Every agent is endowed with one indivisible labor unit and wealth A. Wealth completely
depreciates in one period when it stays unused. It is assumed that entrepreneurial ability is
not correlated with wealth.4 The population is described by a continuously di¤erentiable
distribution function G(A), which gives the measure of the population with wealth less
than A. The probability density function is given by g(A) with support [0; I], where I
is the setup cost of starting a rm which is assumed to be the same for every agent.





3.2 The sequence of events
Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of the events. Everything happens in one period. Since
everyones wealth is less than I those who become entrepreneurs have to borrow from
banks to start their rms.5 At the beginning of the period (time-t ), agents choose their
occupations. Then, nancial contracts are signed, investments are made, and production
takes place. At the end of the period (time-t+), payo¤s are realized, and successful
entrepreneurs pay wages to workers. Finally, agents pay o¤ their loans and banks pay the
interest rate for deposits in addition to principals.
Figure 1: The Sequence of Events
3.3 Information
The types of agents are known only by them, but the distribution of types in every
wealth level is public information. Wealth is perfectly observable by banks. Workers can
observe neither the wealth nor the success probability of their employers. They cannot
see the nancial contracts between their employers and banks, either. However, they have
rational expectations about the average success probability of the entrepreneurs in the
economy. Output is veriable, which implies that courts can enforce contracts.
4The model can easily be extended to the case in which wealth and ability are correlated. Section 7
of Inci (2006) the web version of this paper briey discusses this extension.
5The analysis can be straightforwardly extended to the case where some agentswealth exceeds I.
None of the qualitative results of the paper depends on this assumption.
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3.4 Banks
Banks are risk-neutral and they compete in Bertrand fashion. They simultaneously form
their beliefs and choose the contracts they will be o¤ering, taking the risk-free interest
rate, R, and the wage rate, w, as given. Since they observe the wealth levels, they may
o¤er distinct contracts in every wealth level. Hence, given the factor prices, they o¤er
contracts that are contingent on announced type and outcome (success or failure) in every
wealth level. Let the repayment to the bank by agent i in the success state be DSi (R;w;A)
and DFi (R;w;A) in the failure state.

















where CH is the contract designed for high-type agents and CL is that for low-type and
shirking high-type agents.7 I assume that there is limited liability. Therefore, the terms
of contracts cannot leave agents with negative end-of-period payo¤s:
Y Si  0 and Y Fi  0 8i = H;L ; (3)
where Y Si is the payo¤ of agent i in the success state and Y
F
i is the payo¤ of agent i in
the failure state.
3.5 Entrepreneurs
I dene an entrepreneur as an individual who undertakes risky real investment in the
form of starting a rm. Entrepreneurs are not only self-employed individuals but also
employers. There is ownership, but no shareholdership.
Starting a rm requires at least I units of capital, and labor is essential for production.
Production is risky in the sense that it generates higher output only with probability pi
and lower output with probability 1  pi (lower output is normalized to zero). Therefore,




f(l) with probability pi
0 with probability 1  pi

if k  I
0 otherwise
9=; 8i = H;L ; (4)
where k is capital, l is labor and f(l) is a strictly concave production function with dimin-
ishing marginal returns to labor (i.e., f(0) = 0; f
0
(l) > 0; f
00
(l) < 0). Production function
is assumed to satisfy the Inada conditions (i.e., liml!0 f
0
(l) =1 and liml!1 f 0(l) = 0).
With this technology, capital is still a decision variable. However, the decision is an all-
or-none decision in the sense that agents decide whether to invest or not to invest. The
model can be extended to allow agents to choose the number of projects they would like to
manage in a similar fashion to Banerjee and Newman (1993). Then, I can be interpreted
6I do not put nonnegativity restrictions on repayments to banks. Later, I show that banks may o¤er
contracts with DSL(R;w;A) < 0 and D
F
L (R;w;A) < 0 in some wealth levels. That is, they can give money
to low-type agents to prevent them from applying loans.
7I shall drop subscript z whenever it does not cause any confusion.
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as the unit project size. Doing so would obviously produce more results, but it would not
alter the intuitions in the present paper.
Since A is not su¢ cient to fully cover the setup cost of a rm, entrepreneurs have to
borrow a loan of I   A from the bank.8 Then, the expected payo¤ of an entrepreneur,
Ei (R;w;A), is given by
Ei (R;w;A) := pi(f(l) wl DSi (R;w;A))  (1  pi)DFi (R;w;A) mi 8i = H;L ;
(5)
where mi is dened by
mi =

e if i = H
0 if i = L
: (6)
An entrepreneur is going to be successful with probability pi and produce f(l). He pays
wl to the workers and gives DSi (R;w;A) to the bank. Thus, the expected net return in
the success state is pi(f(l)   wl   DSi (R;w;A)). When he is unsuccessful he produces
something less than f(l) (which is normalized to zero), pays something less than wl to
the workers (which is normalized to zero), and gives DFi to the bank. However, limited
liability prevents DFi from being higher than what the entrepreneur has. Since the output
in case of failure is normalized to zero, DFi is going to be zero as well, but for the sake of
generality of the analysis, I start o¤ without imposing the limited liability.9 For brevity,
from now on, I shall denote net output in the success state with (w):
(w) := max
flg
[f(l)  wl] : (7)
3.6 Workers
An agent who chooses to become a worker is employed at an entrepreneurs rm. Given
the information structure in section 3.3, there has to be a random matching between en-
trepreneurs and workers. The common wage rate is w, and is paid only if the entrepreneur
is successful. Let the weighted average of the success probabilities of entrepreneurs in the
economy be pe. Then, a workers expected wage income is given by pew. Workers can also
deposit their wealth into a bank and receive a risk-free (gross) interest rate of R. Hence,
the expected payo¤ of an agent who becomes a worker, Wi (R;w;A), is given by
Wi (R;w;A) := p
ew +RA 8i = H;L : (8)
Some of the risk of the rm is borne by the workers on this specication.10 This is similar
to an e¢ ciency wage scheme. Firms pay w in a success state and a lower wage in a failure
state where the lower wage is normalized to zero. This specication is consistent with
the empirical ndings that the returns to entrepreneurship vary more than returns to
wage-earning.11
8Later, it is shown that there has to be maximum self-nance in equilibrium.
9In a failure state, entrepreneurs pay neither the loans nor the wages in equilibrium. Thus, I do not
need to make a statement about the seniority of the loan and wage payments.
10In this sense, the model diverts from the risk-based "Knightian" theory of entrepreneurship in which
entrepreneurs bear all the risk of production. Newman (2006) shows that risk-based explanations for
entrepreneurship are inadequate.
11In an alternative setting, payo¤ of a worker can be interpreted as the expected return to market
portfolio in which one part is the riskless return on, say, government bonds and the other part is the risky
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As indicated before, this paper concentrates on the occupational choice problem with the
focus being on the entrepreneurs. As a natural simplication, I assume that all agents
are equally able as workers. In the real world, however, agents di¤er in their abilities
as workers as well. In such a world, an e¢ cient allocation entails that those with a
comparative advantage in entrepreneurship will become entrepreneurs. My assumption
that all agents are equally able as workers eliminates the distinction between comparative
and absolute advantage.12
4 Partial Equilibrium
This section focuses on the decisions of agents and banks when w and R are given. In
Section 5, I shall endogenize them. All of the contracts derived separately in the following
sections are shown at once in Figure 6.
4.1 Equilibrium denition
An equilibrium is a set of contract o¤ers by banks which are consistent with each other.
Each bank o¤ers agents a set of contracts that maximizes their prots. Agents choose the
best contract for them among all alternatives.13 I impose a Wilson equilibrium concept
(Wilson, 1977).14 ;15. In a Wilson equilibrium there is nonmyopic rationality in the sense
that, during decision making, banks take into account the e¤ects of their actions on the
actions of the other banks. That is, a bank would not o¤er a deviation contract that
would incur losses once the unprotable contracts o¤ered by all the other banks have
been withdrawn. This rules out potential nonexistence issues analyzed in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). Formally, an equilibrium in the credit market is dened as follows.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium Concept) Assume that banks are nonmyopic Bertrand-Wil-
son players following pure strategies. Given w and R, a credit market equilibrium is a set
of contract o¤ers by banks such that all sets of contracts earn nonnegative prots in every
wealth level. There is no new set of contracts that could earn higher prots even after the
elimination of all unprotable sets of contracts.
return to a portfolio of stocks, and the payo¤ of an entrepreneur is a share of a rm.
12Parker (2003) works on a model in which ability applies to both occupations. Agents might have
various entrepreneurial skills as well. This problem has been studied by Lazear (2005) which states that
entrepreneurs must be jacks-of-all-trades who need not excel in any one skill, but are competent in many.
13Assuming free entry or xed number of banks do not make any di¤erence.
14A Wilson equilibrium can be obtained by changing the extensive form of a Nash game by allowing
two rounds of play for banks, as is done in Hellwig (1987). First, banks announce the set of contracts
they would like to o¤er. Then, they may withdraw as many contracts as they wish. Finally, agents choose
the set of contracts they would like to accept. In that sense the two conjectures di¤er from each other
in their extensive forms. Otherwise, the solution concept is still subgame perfection. The equilibrium
concept dened in Denition 1 is a short-cut to this extensive form. In that sense, every Nash equilibrium
is also a Wilson equilibrium, but there can be a Wilson equilibrium in cases in which there is no Nash
equilibrium.
15The imposition of Wilson equilibrium concept changes neither the nature nor the main results of
the paper. This is explained in greater detail in footnote 19.
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An equilibriummust be individually rational for every agent. Individual rationality asserts
that agents choose an occupation only if it is better than staying inactive. With the
assumption of complete depreciation, this means
oi (A)  0 8i = H;L ^ 8o = E;W (9a)
R  0 : (9b)
An equilibrium has to be incentive compatible for every agent. Incentive compatibility
assures that none of the agents has incentive to misrepresent his type:
maxfEH(A);EL (A)g  maxfpHY SL   e+ (1  pH)Y FL ; EL (A)g (10a)
EL (A)  pLY SH + (1  pL)Y FH : (10b)
The rst one says that none of the high-type agents would be attracted by the contracts
designed for low-type agents regardless of whether they provide e¤ort or not. The second
one says the same for low-type agents.
In an equilibrium, proper participation constraints must hold for every agent. Partici-
pation constraints guarantee that agents choose the occupation that makes them strictly
better o¤:
Wi (A) > 
E
i (A) 8i; j = H;L () W i E 8i = H;L (11a)
Wi (A) < 
E
i (A) 8i; j = H;L () E i W 8i = H;L ; (11b)
where W i E means that agent i strictly prefers wage-earning to entrepreneurship (sim-
ilarly for E i W ). It should also be specied what agents do when they are indi¤erent
between the two occupations. The next assumption asserts that they choose wage-earning
in such situations.
Assumption 1 (Occupational Indi¤erence) Wi (A) = 
E
i (A) 8i; j = H;L =)
W i E 8i = H;L.
I also need to specify what agents do when they are equally attracted to di¤erent contracts.
As stated in the next assumption, if agents have more than one best alternative, they
choose one of them with equal probabilities.
Assumption 2 (Contractual Indi¤erence) 8i = H;L ^ 8o = E;W ^ 8z; l =
f1; :::; ng
foi (R;w;A) j Ciz(A)g = foi (R;w;A) j Cil(A)g =) PrfCiz(A) i Cil(A)g = 1=n.
Assumption 1 is an assumption about the preferences of the agents over occupations when
they are indi¤erent between them. However, Assumption 2 is an assumption about the
preferences of the agents over the set of contracts when they are indi¤erent between them.
It states that they do not mind from whom they take the contract.
4.2 The banksproblem
I can now derive the set of contracts o¤ered by banks. I start o¤ by deriving the zero
prot conditions for banks and the iso-prot lines for agents. The zero prot condition
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with only high-type agents who provide e¤ort is
pH((w)  Y SH )  (1  pH)Y FH = R(I   A) ; (12)
and the same with low-type or shirking high-type agents is
pL((w)  Y SL )  (1  pL)Y FL = R(I   A) : (13)
The corresponding iso-prot lines are given by
pHY
S
H + (1  pH)Y FH = Y EH (14a)
pLY
S
L + (1  pL)Y FL = Y EL ; (14b)
where Y EH and Y
E




L , respectively. Note that both iso-prot lines
are parallel to the corresponding zero prot conditions for banks. Finally, the zero prot
condition with both types is
pDS + (1  p)DF = R(I   A) ; (15)
whereDS is the repayment in the success state andDS is the repayment in the failure state
of a random loan applicant with wealth level A, and p is the Bayesian success probability
of him:
p = hpH + (1  h)pL : (16)
Four di¤erent equilibria may arise depending on the wealth of a given agent. Figure 2
illustrates the threshold levels that separate these di¤erent equilibria in the Y F   Y S
space with some abuse of geometry.16 Limited liability requires that a contract lie in the
rst quadrant. ZPH , ZPL, and ZPHL are the graphs of zero prot conditions (12), (13),
and (15), respectively, for a particular value of A. An agents payo¤ in case he becomes
a worker is given by (8). Call this payo¤ the outside option (to entrepreneurship).
There are low-type agents with a particular wealth level whose iso-prot lines passing
through their outside option also pass through the point where ZPHL intersects the Y S-
axis. L1L
0
1 is an iso-prot line for such agents. Denote their wealth level with AL. There
are also agents with a particular wealth level whose iso-prot lines passing through their
outside option also pass through the intersection of ZPH and the Y S-axis. L2L
0
2 is an
iso-prot line for such agents and I denote the wealth level that represents them with ~A.
I derive the expressions for AL and ~A when I analyze the decisions of agents.
It can be shown that for wealth levels between [0; AL], banks o¤er cross-subsidizing pool-
ing contracts; for wealth levels between [AL; ~A], they o¤er cross-subsidizing separating
contracts; and for wealth levels between [ ~A; I], they o¤er rst-best e¢ cient separating
contracts which are accepted only by high-type agents who provide e¤ort. All of these
contracts assume that high-type agents provide e¤ort. There is no adverse selection prob-
lem in the wealth classes in which they do not provide e¤ort, since whenever they do not
provide e¤ort they are no di¤erent from low-type agents in terms of their success prob-
ability. So, banks o¤er a pooling contract in these success-probability-wise homogenous
wealth levels. Figure 2 does not show this possibility but Section 4.4 analyzes the e¤ort
16The lines drawn are functions of A, and hence, their positions are di¤erent for di¤erent values of A.
For expositional convenience, I show all lines at once in one graph.
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Figure 2: Contract O¤ers
decision of agents.17 The following proposition formally proves these ndings.
Proposition 1 (Contracts) When high-type agents provide e¤ort in entrepreneurship,
banks o¤er the cross-subsidizing pooling contract C(A) to agents with wealth levels be-
tween [0; AL], cross-subsidizing separating contract C(A) to agents with wealth levels
between [AL; ~A], and the rst-best e¢ cient separating contract C(A) to agents with
wealth levels between [ ~A; I]. When high-type agents do not provide e¤ort, banks o¤er the
pooling contract C(A).
Proof. See Section 4.3 for the derivation of the cross-subsidizing separating contracts and
the denition of C(A). Appendix A contains the derivations of the rest of the contracts.
C(A), C(A), and C(A) are dened in the proofs.
The proof of Proposition 1 highlights another important nding. When the strategy
space of banks is large enough they can always nd a set of deviation contracts such that
positive prots are competed away. Positive prots arise only when the strategy space is
restricted. For example, restricting the strategy space to loan contracts in which banks
cannot give out money to the agents at the end of the period would result in positive
prots. Given that agents produce nothing in the failure state and banks cannot give
out money, the rents given to the low-type agents, and some portion of the end-of-period
payo¤ of e¤ort-providing high-type agents, are emitted by banks in the form of positive
prots. Other than the cases in which there are such restrictions on the strategy space,
there are always zero prots in this and similar games.
Lemma 1 (Banking Prots) When banks strategy space is large enough, they make
zero prots from every set of contract they o¤er.
17Note that, in any given wealth level, either all or none of the high-type agents provide e¤ort in
entrepreneurship.
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Proof. See Section 4.3 and Appendix A.
In GMS banks can make positive prots with separating contracts whereas in my setting
these prots can be competed away since banks can pay "higher interest rates" for the
deposits of low-type agents just to keep them out of the loan market by o¤ering cross-
subsidizing separating contracts. Below I focus on the derivation of this contract and
show how positive prots may arise when the strategy space is restricted.
4.3 Cross-subsidizing separating contracts
Banks o¤er cross-subsidizing separating contracts to the agents with wealth levels between
[AL; ~A]. They cannot o¤er pooling contracts because the outside option to entrepreneur-
ship yields strictly higher payo¤s than any pooling contract that makes zero prots with
both types. This is shown in Figure 3. The iso-prot line that passes through the outside
option of low-type agents is given by L1L
0
1, and that of e¤ort-providing high-type agents
is given by H1H
0
1. Any contract has to be on or over the upper envelope of these two
iso-prot lines. Since ZPHL is below this envelope anywhere in the rst quadrant, banks
cannot design any pooling contract that can make nonnegative prots with both types.
Figure 3: Positive Prots with a Restricted Strategy Space
The next point of concern is whether banks can design separating contracts. Start with
the separating contract (C1; C2). Banks o¤er the standard loan contract C1 to high-type
agents who provide e¤ort. It is immediate to see that high-type agents strictly prefer C1
over C2. Banks o¤er C2 to low-type agents, which di¤ers from a standard loan contract.
According to this contract, low-type agents deposit their wealth with the bank and get a
job. At the end of the period, they receive a gross interest income of RA from the bank and
an expected wage of pew from their employer. Contract (C1; C2) makes low-type agents
indi¤erent between the two occupations. By assumption 1, they choose wage-earning, and
therefore, stay out of entrepreneurship.
As far as the "loan contracts," which determine the nonnegative repayments to the banks
at the end of the period, are concerned, (C1; C2) is an equilibrium in which banks make
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positive prots. However, the strategy space of banks is not limited to loan contracts
only. A bank can undercut this contract by o¤ering some amount of money to low-type
agents in both states of the world in addition to the usual interest income it o¤ers to
the deposits. This would be a plausible deviation as long as the incentive compatibility
condition for e¤ort-providing high-type agents is not violated (e.g., the deviation contract
must be above H2H
0
2). Such a contract is shown with (C1; C3) in Figure 3. There is
always such a deviation contract in [AL; ~A] since ZPH is always above, and any contract
on ZPH makes zero prots with e¤ort-providing high-type agents.
Figure 4: Cross-subsidizing Separating Contracts
Undercutting goes on until banks make zero prots with these contracts. Then, what
would be the equilibrium? Start with (C1; C2) in Figure 4, and move the iso-prot line
of low-type agents parallel to L1L
0







1 and ZPH such that e¤ort-providing high-type agents strictly prefer C

H , and
low-type agents weakly prefer CL . In such a situation, by Assumption 2, agents choose
one of the contracts o¤ered in the market with equal probabilities. Banks make prots
on CH and incur losses on C

L . In the end, the equilibrium contract is the separating
contract (CH ; C

L ) that makes zero prots, but it still requires cross-subsidization between
the types.
The terms of contract CH yield a payo¤ of some y(A) dollars in the success state and
nothing in the failure state. Meanwhile, contract CL requires that agents deposit their
money with the bank in consideration. At the end of the period, bank pays a regular RA
plus an extra x(A) dollars.18 This is nothing but a higher interest payment to low-type
agents to prevent them applying to the loans designed for high-type agents who provide
e¤ort. Since low-type agents have to be indi¤erent between the two contracts
pLy(A) = RA+ p
ew + x(A) : (17)
Moreover, this contract has to yield zero expected prots to banks in Bertrand compe-
18This scheme is similar to the bank promotions in which they promise to deposit $20 to the account of
the individual if individuals open a savings account with them. However, their motive for this is di¤erent.
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tition. Assume there are n such contracts o¤ered in the market. Then, the zero prot





(1  h)x(A) = 1
n
hR(I   A) + 1
n
R(1  h)x(A) : (18)
All terms are multiplied by 1=n since agents choose one of the contracts with equal proba-
bilities by Assumption 2. The rst term on the left-hand side of (18) is the total repayment
of high-type agents in expected terms, whereas the second term is the payment to low-
type agents to keep them out of the loan market. x(A) is indeed a pure informational
rent that goes to low-type agents and is nanced by high-type agents who provide e¤ort.
The right-hand side of the equation shows the cost of funds for banks. The rst term
is the cost of funds that are provided as loans to e¤ort-providing high-type agents, and
the second is the cost of funds that are given to low-type agents as informational rents.
Solving (17) and (18) for x(A) and y(A) yields the form of the contracts for any wealth




























(1  h)(1 +R) + hpH
pL
: (20)
A Nash player would still deviate from C(A) simply by canceling CL . Given that
all other banks are o¤ering (CH ; C

L ), all low-type agents go to these banks, and the
deviating bank would enjoy prots since only e¤ort-providing high-type agents apply to
it for loans. However, such a deviation would not occur with Wilson players since they
are nonmyopic rationals. A potential deviant knows that once other banks cancel CL , it
will incur losses. So, it would not deviate in the rst place.19 Wilson (1977) explains how
this kind of expectation can arise in reality.20
Unlike the conventional separating equilibria, here low-type agents become workers but
are still cross-subsidized by e¤ort-providing high-type agents who actually become entre-
preneurs. Moreover, in contrast to the pooling contracts in which the cross-subsidization
is within entrepreneurship, here the cross-subsidization is between the occupations. Lit-
erally, low-type agents earn informational rents on their deposits. I record this result in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Occupational Cross-subsidies) Low-type agents with wealth levels be-
tween [AL; ~A] gather informational rents even though they stay inactive in the loan market
19Remember that this equilibrium can be supported as PBE of a sequential game as explained in
Section 4.1. If one does not buy this equilibrium concept, one is left with nonexistence. As an alternative
solution to this nonexistence problem, I could impose a Nash equilibrium concept and restrict the strategy
space to loan contracts only. Then, the rents are gathered by banks in the form of positive prots rather
than low-type and shirking high-type agents, and the equilibrium contract would be given by (C1; C2)
in Figure 3. Whether I impose a Bertrand-Nash or a Bertrand-Wilson equilibrium concept, neither the
nature of the model nor the main results of this paper changes. There is still a xed pool of entrepreneurs
and the problem is still how to increase the number of e¤ort-providing high-type agents in this pool.
20A recent advertisement of a bank also conrms such expectations. A copy of the advertisement is
available upon request.
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and become workers. This rent is nanced by high-type agents who become entrepreneurs.
Proof. The rst part of the result follows directly from (19) and the second part is due
to Lemma 1.
4.4 The agentsproblem
Having analyzed the various kinds of contract o¤ers made by banks, I now focus on
the decisions of agents. I assume that if agents had enough wealth to self-nance their
rms, it would be protable for high-type agents who provide e¤ort but not for low-type
agents. This also means that the economic activity of low-type agents is socially ine¢ cient.
However, they may still want to become entrepreneurs to make use of cross-subsidization
in the loan market induced by pooling contracts. The assumption below formalizes these
statements by determining the net present value (NPV) of the projects.
Assumption 3 (NPV of Projects) pH(w)   e > pew + RI > pL(w) > pew +
(pL=p)RI.
Note that Assumption 3 asserts that the cost of e¤ort is low enough such that providing
e¤ort is protable for an e¤ort-providing high-type agent (e.g., (pH pL)(w) > e). I also
make the assumption that the cost of e¤ort is not too low.
Assumption 4 (Cost of E¤ort) e > (pH   pL)w.
This assumption is needed for existence in the general equilibrium. Reorganizing it gives
pLw > pHw   e. From an ex ante point of view, this means that the opportunity cost of
an entrepreneur forgone by not hiring himself as a worker in his rm is higher when he
shirks than when he provides e¤ort.
Before solving the agentsproblem, I shall note that there has to be maximum self-nance
in equilibrium. The reason is that low-type agents can become entrepreneurs only with
contracts that require cross-subsidization. If all types have an incentive to apply for
loans, high-type agents who provide e¤ort have to cross-subsidize the low-type agents.
As indicated in de Meza and Webb (1987), in such a case, they would prefer to self-
nance themselves as much as possible since self-nancing has better terms than any
cross-subsidizing contract o¤ered by banks. This, in turn, implies that if there are agents
who are not using all of their wealth in their rms, they must be either low-type or
shirking high-type agents. However, this is inconsistent with the equilibrium, in the sense
that banks would not o¤er the same pooling contract to them but a di¤erent one that
discourages them from applying for loans. This means that all agents use their wealth
in their rms. This also guarantees that simultaneously borrowing and lending makes no
di¤erence.
To start, consider the agentsproblem given that pooling contracts that make zero prots




(I   A))  e > pew +RA ; (21)
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and they provide e¤ort in entrepreneurship if
pH((w)  R
p
(I   A))  e > pL((w)  R
p
(I   A)) : (22)
Low-type agents would like to become entrepreneurs if
pL((w)  R
p
(I   A)) > pew +RA : (23)
Solving (21) and (22) for A reveals that high-type agents prefer becoming entrepreneurs
if their wealth is higher than a threshold level AH , which is dened by
AH :=
pew   pH((w)  Rp I) + e
R(pH
p
  1) ; (24)
and they provide e¤ort if their wealth is higher than a threshold level Ae, which is dened
by






In a similar fashion, solving (23) for A reveals that low-type agents prefer to become
entrepreneurs if their wealth is lower than a threshold level AL, which is dened by
AL :=





This means that low-type agents prefer becoming entrepreneurs only if a signicant por-
tion of their rm is nanced by the bank. Alternatively, they prefer applying for loans
only when they can enjoy large enough cross-subsidies. The situation is di¤erent for high-
type agents. They prefer self-nancing their projects as much as possible since they have
to cross-subsidize low-type agents for every penny they borrow. Hence, high-type agents
prefer becoming entrepreneurs only if they can self-nance a su¢ ciently large portion of
their project.
It can be shown that AL > 0 by Assumption 3. In this paper, I neglect some uninteresting
cases by assuming that Ae > 0 and that AL > Ae. The rst one rules out the case in which
all high-type agents provide e¤ort when they become entrepreneurs, and the second one
rules out the case in which there is no adverse selection problem.21 Note that AL > Ae
implies AH < Ae, which in turn implies that, in principle, there can be high-type agents
who would not provide e¤ort had they become entrepreneurs. However, later I show that
there cannot be any shirking high-type entrepreneurs in equilibrium. The results that
emerge from the above analysis regarding the decisions of agents is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Occupational Decisions) All agents in [0; Ae] prefer becoming work-
ers. All agents in [Ae; AL] prefer becoming entrepreneurs. High-type agents in [AL; I]
prefer becoming entrepreneurs and their low-type counterparts prefer becoming workers.
21The analysis of these cases is trivial and left to the reader.
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Proof. See Section 4.3 and Appendix A.
Given the contracts and factor prices in the market, any high-type agent who prefers
becoming an entrepreneur provides e¤ort in entrepreneurship and any high-type agent
who does not provide e¤ort cannot become an entrepreneur. In [0; Ae], high-type agents
do not become entrepreneurs either because they do not want to or because they do not
provide e¤ort. However, both of these are induced by the low wealth endowments of the
agents in this range. Had they become entrepreneurs, they would have to cross-subsidize
low-type agents, which they cannot a¤ord to do at the same time that they provide e¤ort.
Hence, they do not provide e¤ort and cannot become an entrepreneur. Nonetheless, with
a lower risk-free interest rate, they would be willing to provide e¤ort in entrepreneurship,
and this would enable banks to o¤er loans to them. This intuition forms the base of the
policy I propose in Section 6.
Proposition 4 (E¤ort Decision) High-type entrepreneurs provide e¤ort in equilibrium.
Proof. See Section 4.3 and Appendix A.
This result does not follow simply from the assumption on the position of the threshold
wealth level Ae. Wherever Ae lies, the average risk of the pool of the applicants under
this threshold is pL. Then, banks o¤er a lending interest rate of R=pL, which e¤ectively
discourages shirking high-type agents from entrepreneurship under Assumption 3. From
now on, I do not need to distinguish between a high-type entrepreneur and a high-type
entrepreneur who provides e¤ort.
4.5 Lending Interest Rates
In the previous sections, I derived the contracts o¤ered by banks and analyzed the deci-
sions of agents given these contracts. This section recasts contracts in terms of lending
interest rates. This provides an overview of the loan market and allows me to summarize
all loan contracts in one gure (which is Figure 6). I begin with showing that the optimal
way of nancing is debt in this model.
Lemma 2 (Form of Lending Contracts) Whenever agents borrow money from banks,
it takes the simple debt form. Moreover, debt is the optimal way of nancing in this model.
Proof. The rst part of the lemma follows directly from Proposition 1. For the second
part, the intuitive proof follows from the fact that low-type agents have more probability
weight on the failure state outcome than high-type agents. Thus, they always prefer
equity-form contracts. Knowing this, it is not optimal for banks to o¤er neither equity-
form nor a mixture of equity- and debt-form contracts. Hence, debt is the optimal way of
nancing in this model. Technically, the expected payo¤s of agents can be ranked in the
FOSD sense, and for a two-point payo¤ distribution, FOSD always implies the monotone
likelihood ratio property. It is shown by Innes (1993) that, in this case, with limited
liability and risk neutrality, the optimal way of nancing has to take the debt form.
By Proposition 1, there can be four di¤erent loan applicant pools depending on wealth
level. Consider Figure 5. For wealth levels in [0; Ae], high-type agents do not provide
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e¤ort and banks o¤er no-e¤ort pooling contracts. Thus, the average risk of the applicant
pool in [0; Ae] is indeed pL, and the corresponding lending interest rate for these contracts
is R=pL. Any interest rate below R=pL would incur losses and any interest rate above is
undercut by Bertrand competition.
Figure 5: Threshold Wealth Levels
Consider now the wealth levels between [Ae; AL]. I have already shown that banks o¤er
cross-subsidizing pooling contracts to these wealth levels. Moreover, high-type agents with
these wealth levels provide e¤ort and both types of agents prefer becoming entrepreneurs.
The risk of the applicant pool is thus p, and the corresponding lending interest rate is
R=p. Any interest rate lower than R=p incurs a loss for banks, and any interest rate above
R=p is undercut by the Bertrand competition.
For wealth levels in [AL; I], only high-type agents prefer becoming entrepreneurs, and
one might be tempted to think that banks should o¤er the lending interest rate R=pH .
However, with that interest rate, the participation constraint is violated for some low-type
agents whose wealth is slightly above AL. That is, they no longer prefer wage-earning
to entrepreneurship. Formally, with a lending interest rate of R=p, the participation
constraint of low-type agents with wealth exactly equal to AL is binding:
pL((w)  R
p
(I   AL)) = pew +RAL : (27)
Now focus on the participation constraint of agents with wealth AL + ". Given that the
lending interest rate o¤ered by banks is R=pH , this yields
pL((w)  R
pH











(I   AL   ")) > pew +R(AL + ") ; (28)
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and therefore, the participation constraint is violated for low-type agents within the band
[AL; ~A], where ~A is dened by22
pL((w)  R
pH
(I   ~A)) = pew +R ~A : (29)
The bank cannot o¤er a lending interest rate of R=pH to the agents within this band.
Otherwise, low-type agents would be attracted by the contract in addition to high-type
agents. Then what is the lending interest rate in [AL; ~A]? Assume for the moment that
the banks o¤ers a loan contract that makes the low-type agents with these wealth levels
indi¤erent between the two occupations. Let ~RL(A) be such a lending interest rate. A
low-type agent is indi¤erent between the two occupations if
EL (A) = 
W
L (A) : (30)
By making use of (19) and (30), ~RL(A) can be written as
~RL(A) =
pL(w)  pew  RA  x(A)
pL(I   A) 8A 2 [AL;
~A] ; (31)
where @ ~RL(A)=@A < 0 and limA!I ~RL(A) =  1.23
Given this contract, I now check if there is any deviation contract in any wealth level
between [AL; ~A]. By Assumption 1, low-type agents choose to become workers when they
are indi¤erent between the two occupations. Start with the case in which all banks o¤er
the lending interest ~RL(A) and one bank deviates by o¤ering an interest rate just below
it. That deviation contract would attract both high- and low-type agents. When both
types of agents with these wealth levels apply for loans, nonnegative prots are possible
only with an interest rate higher than or equal to R=p. Therefore, any interest rate below
~RL(A) is loss making. Given that the interest rate o¤ered by the other banks is ~RL(A),
none of the banks would want to deviate by o¤ering a higher interest rate since none of
the agents would be attracted by that contract. Then, banks o¤er ~RL(A) in [AL; ~A].
Finally, focus on the wealth levels between [ ~A; I]. Any loan applicant with these wealth
levels must be a high-type agent since none of the low-type agents prefer becoming en-
trepreneurs in these wealth classes. The equilibrium lending interest rate is then R=pH .
Any interest rate below R=pH is loss making, and any interest rate above is undercut by
Bertrand competition. All of these results are recorded in the following remark.
Remark 1 (Lending Interest Rates) Banks o¤er a lending interest rate of R=pL in
[0; Ae], R=p in [Ae; AL], ~RL(A) in [AL; ~A], and R=pH in [ ~A; I], where ~A is dened by
~A :=




> 0 : (32)
22Note that Assumption 3 guarantees that ~A < I. Combining this with 0 < AL < ~A yields 0 < AL <
~A < I.
23Note that there is also R^L(A) in Figure 6. ~RL(A) is dened when the low-type agents earn infor-
mation rents with cross-subsidizing separating contracts whereas R^L(A) is the similar interest rate with
pooling contracts. R^L(A) equals to (pL(w)  pew  RA)=(pL(I  A)).
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Note that the lending interest rate is a mark-up on the cost of loanable funds. For wealth
levels between [0; AL] and [ ~A; I], the mark-up is constant and directly associated with the
risk of the loan applicant pool. It is still associated with the risk of the pool in [AL; ~A], but
it also depends on wealth levels. It also bears mentioning that in [AL; ~A] banks follow a
limit pricing strategy for the loans by making low-type agents indi¤erent between the two
occupations. Nonetheless, as discussed before, banks give information rents to low-type
agents to keep them inactive in the loan market in these contracts.
4.6 Endogenous wealth classes
An overview of the market is shown in Figure 6. R^L(A) is the lending interest rate that
makes low-type agents indi¤erent between the two occupation with a pooling contract.
~RL(A) is the similar interest rate with a cross-subsidizing separating contract.24 Banks
o¤er pooling contracts under AL and separating contracts over it. The equilibrium lending
interest rates, indicated in Remark 1, are shown with bold lines in the gure. The con-
tractual structure in the lending market endogenously forms four di¤erent wealth classes
in the economy: the poor, the lower-middle, the upper-middle, and the rich class.
The poor class agents are the ones whose wealth levels are in between [0; Ae]. They are
all isolated from the loan market owing to the facts that only pooling contracts can be
o¤ered and that high-type agents do not provide e¤ort in entrepreneurship in this wealth
class. If they do not provide e¤ort, their success probability in entrepreneurship is the
same as the success probability of low-type agents. This makes banks o¤er an interest rate
of R=pL to the poor class, which is su¢ cient to discourage all poor agents from applying
for loans and becoming entrepreneurs. So, the source of the market failure in the poor
class is the downward distortion of the occupational decisions. That is, high-type agents
in the poor class do not become entrepreneurs because of wealth constraints.
I call the wealth class [Ae; AL] the lower-middle class. As in the poor class, banks are
able to o¤er this wealth class only pooling contracts. However, now the source of the
market failure is the upward distortion of the occupational decisions. The fact that high-
type agents cannot be distinguished from low-type agents results in a situation where
low-type agents are attracted to the bank loans. Consequently, both types of agents
become entrepreneurs in the lower-middle wealth class, and the high-type members of this
wealth class cross-subsidize their low-type counterparts. The cross-subsidies are within
entrepreneurship in this wealth class.
The wealth class in [AL; ~A] is the upper-middle class. In this class, banks are able to
o¤er separating contracts. As a result, low-type agents become workers and high-type
agents become entrepreneurs. As I have shown before, high-type agents still need to
cross-subsidize low-type agents in the loan market. However, this time the cross-subsidies
are between the occupations.
Finally, I call the wealth class in [ ~A; I] the rich class. They do not need to borrow as
much to be able to become entrepreneurs. This means that the low-type agents do not
benet from the cross-subsidies to the same extent as the low-type agents with lower
wealth levels. Thus, they are not attracted to the bank loans even when banks o¤er an
e¢ cient contract with an interest rate of R=pH . Then, they all become workers whereas
24The wedge between them is a measure of the informational rents that go to low-type agents.
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Figure 6: Overview of the Market
their high-type counterparts become entrepreneurs. These contracts do not entail any
cross-subsidies among loan applicants.
An important point to note is that none of the entrepreneurs have incentives to destroy
their wealth to be able to get a loan in a poorer wealth class. This can be understood
simply from the derivation of equilibrium contracts in Section 4.2 which shows that equi-
librium contracts for higher wealth levels are associated with higher iso-prot lines for
entrepreneurs.
4.7 Entrepreneurship and economic development
It is known as a stylized fact that entrepreneurship is better in developed countries than
in developing countries. This section provides one explanation for this. Figure 6 reects
the fact that adverse selection hits the economy at relatively lower wealth levels: in the
poor (i.e., A 2 [Ae; AL]) and the lower-middle (i.e., A 2 [Ae; AL]) classes. The cross-
subsidies do not change with the wealth level in these wealth classes. In the upper-middle
class (i.e., A 2 [AL; ~A]), there are transfers between occupations in the form of e¢ cient
information rents. However, there is no adverse selection problem in this class since these
transfers do not distort the occupational decisions. Moreover, cross-subsidies decrease
with wealth level and ultimately become zero at ~A. Finally, there is no problem in both
the occupational decisions and the pricing of the loans in the rich class (i.e., A 2 [ ~A; I]).
These contractual di¤erences between wealth classes provide some insights into the phases
of development in economies. If there are more people in the poor and the lower-middle
classes in a developing country than in a developed country, the adverse selection should
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be more of an issue for the former. As agents start accumulating wealth, more and
more of them are expected to move from the poor and the lower-middle classes to the
upper-middle and the rich classes. Thus, in the development process of an economy, the
problems in the entrepreneurial sectors erected by adverse selection become less and less
severe since some of them turn into transfers between occupations in the form of e¢ cient
information rents (as in the upper-middle class) or completely disappears (as in the rich
class). This is one reason why the entrepreneurial sectors of the developed countries are
better.
The thresholds Ae, AL, and ~A are presumably di¤erent in di¤erent countries. However,
the intuition still applies. What matters in general is whether there are relatively more
people in the poor and the lower-middle classes in which adverse selection distorts occu-
pational decisions. In this model, it happens in relatively lower wealth classes; but this
seems realistic, too. In such situations, implementing the labor market policies I propose
in this paper becomes more compelling. This result is consistent with the GEMs public
policy prescription that poor countries should focus on improving the general business en-
vironment before focusing exclusively on entrepreneurs. In particular, the GEM suggests
that the family income (which can be interpreted as wage-subsidies in the model of this
paper) should be increased. Section 5.3 discusses some other stylized facts.
5 General Equilibrium
The analysis so far has focused on the partial equilibrium in which the wage and the
risk-free interest rates are given. This section carries the analysis to a general equilibrium
by endogenizing the wage and the risk-free interest rates. The purpose of the general
equilibrium analysis is two fold. First, it shows that there are economies in which the
assumptions of the previous sections are satised.25 Second, for the various reasons ex-
plained earlier, this paper conducts the public policy analysis when the labor and credit
markets are interrelated.
In this section, I modify the equilibrium denition slightly to allow for market clearing
conditions. Let E be the number of entrepreneurs in the economy. Denoting the equilib-
rium values of variables with asteriks, the equilibrium is dened as follows.
Denition 2 (Equilibrium Concept) Assume that banks are nonmyopic Bertrand-Wil-
son players following pure strategies. An equilibrium is a quadruple  =(R; w; pe; E)
such that banks earn nonnegative prots in every wealth level. There is no new set of
contracts that could earn higher prots even after the elimination of all unprotable set of
contracts. In an equilibrium, both credit and labor markets clear.
5.1 Equilibrium conditions
As indicated in Denition 2, an equilibrium is characterized by the quadruple . It still
needs to be incentive compatible and individually rational, and it is still the case that
25In that sense, I do not solve for the full-blown general equilibrium, but this is su¢ cient for my
purpose of showing that e¢ ciency might require taxing entrepreneurs.
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proper participation constraints must hold in an equilibrium. I have already imposed
them in partial equilibrium. Below I analyze the remaining equilibrium conditions to
solve for the quadruple  under Assumption 3.
By Proposition 3, the number of high-type entrepreneurs, EH , and the number of low-type
entrepreneurs, EL, are given by
EH(R;w) = h[1 G(Ae(R;w))] (33a)
EL(R;w; p
e) = (1  h)[G(AL(R;w; pe)) G(Ae(R;w))] ; (33b)
respectively. The total number of entrepreneurs in the economy, E, is then given by
E(R;w; pe) = EH(R;w) + EL(R;w; p
e) : (34)
The weighted average of the success probabilities of all entrepreneurs in the economy, pe,
is given by
pe =




Workers are the source of the loanable funds in the economy and entrepreneurs are the
ones who demand loans. The credit market clears when the demand for credit equals to
the supply of credit. There are E entrepreneurs, each of which uses I units of capital.





This means that the number of entrepreneurs in the economy is equivalent to the aggregate
wealth available in the economy divided by the project size, and thus, is xed. As the
number of entrepreneurs, E, is xed, the number of workers, 1   E, is also xed. Any
policy provided in this model cannot change these numbers, which allows me to focus
exclusively on the quality of entrepreneurs. That is, what matters in this model is not the
size of the set E, but its composition (EH+EL). It bears mentioning here that Gale (1991)
nds that credit subsidies appear to have important e¤ects on the allocation of credit but
do not change the aggregate economic activity. This is consistent with the credit market
clearing condition here. Moreover, Raynold (1995) shows that credit subsidies do not have
a positive e¤ect on output. Thus, success taxes may be needed instead of credit subsidies.
Notice that the xed number of entrepreneurs and workers does not mean that the credit
supply to the banking system is xed. It can change as a result of a change in the
composition of the entrepreneurs in the economy. For example, if you swap a rich low-
type entrepreneur with a poor high-type worker, the supply of loans to banks increases
even though the number of entrepreneurs remains the same. As I show later, the policy
can change who owns the funds and who supplies them in a way that increases the loan
supply to banks. This, in turn, decreases the risk-free and the lending interest rates. Then,
it is su¢ cient to show that this can improve the self-selection in the economy. Oftentimes
this is taken to require extreme policies (such as complete redistribution), whereas I show
in this paper that a small tax and subsidy policy can improve the economy extensively
by inuencing the occupational choice of agents in di¤erent wealth classes.
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Finally, the labor demand by each entrepreneur is
l = l(w) := f
0 1(w) : (37)
The labor market clears when the aggregate supply of labor by workers equals the ag-
gregate demand for labor by entrepreneurs. There are E(w) entrepreneurs and 1 E(w)
workers. Each entrepreneur demands l(w) workers. Thus, the labor market clears when






Eqs. (34), (35), (36), and (38) form a system of four equations in four unknowns, namely
R, w, pe, and E. Moreover, this system has a separable structure. First, eqs. (36) and
(38) form a module from which E and w can be found. Then, after substituting for E
and w, eqs. (34) and (35) give R and pe.
5.3 The number of entrepreneurs and the wage rate
One point of concern is whether there is a unique equilibrium in the w   E module of
separable system of equations. The next proposition rules out the possibility of multiple
equilibria under the plausible assumptions of Section 3.5 on the production function.
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness w) Assume the production function is strictly concave
and satises Inada conditions. Then, there exists a unique wage rate of w.











> 0 since f 00(l) < 0 by strict concavity.
One of the Inada conditions asserts that liml!1 f 0(l) = 0. This condition implies limw!0 l(w) =








Since @l(w)=@w < 0, E(w) is an increasing function, and limw!0 l(w) =1 implies E(0) =
0. Then, (36) has to cut (38) once and only once.
Figure 7 shows the uniqueness of the wage rate graphically. An increase in the aggregate
wealth available in the economy results in an increase in the wage rate, too. This implies
that higher wages are associated with developed countries and lower wages are associated
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Figure 7: The Number of Entrepreneurs and the Wage Rate
with developing countries, which is consistent with the stylized facts listed in Lloyd-
Ellis and Bernhardt (2000).26 Figure 7 depicts another important relation between the
number of entrepreneurs and the wage rate. An increase in the number of entrepreneurs
cannot occur without an increase in the wage levels.27 This is consistent with the policy
prescription of the GEM that underlines the fact that, to improve the entrepreneurial
sectors, developing countries (almost all of which have lower wage levels) should design
policies that enhance the growth of family incomes.
5.4 Possible equilibria in the general equilibrium
Assumption 3 asserts that the NPV of the projects of high-type agents is positive and
that of low-type agents is negative in equilibrium. Thus, low-type agents have socially
ine¢ cient projects but may still apply for loans due to cross-subsidizing pooling contracts.
The analysis here tries to nd ways of improving the average success probability of the pool
of entrepreneurs and the welfare in such situations. The rst point of concern is whether
there is any equilibrium satisfying the assumptions imposed in partial equilibrium. The
following lemma shows that, for every given wage rate, there exists a triangular subspace
in which my assumptions are satised, and that therefore, such an equilibrium is not
26An objection to this reasoning could be that the average project size in di¤erent countries could
be di¤erent. It is certainly true, but still the same intuition applies due to the fact that everything is
scale invariant in terms of investment in this model. Therefore, all results can be interpreted per unit
of investment. This requires scaling the wealth distribution to take that into account, which can be
done without a¤ecting the results. Then, I can write the production function in the intensive form as is
done for any neoclassical constant returns to scale production function. The only di¤erence is, this time,
everything is written per unit of investment rather than per unit of e¤ective labor. Then, f(l) is indeed in
the intensive form, and there is no loss of generality in interpreting A=I in Figure 7 as aggregate wealth
per unit of investment rather than aggregate wealth divided by xed project size.
27By looking at the curve in Figure 7, one should not make the conclusion that the number of workers
is inversely related to the wage rate in the economy. This curve is neither the labor supply nor the labor




Lemma 3 (Equilibrium Subspace) 8w 9
4
(ABC) in which Assumption 3, Assump-
tion 4, and 0 < Ae < AL are satised.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
I make the policy analysis under the assumption that the equilibrium occurs in the triangle
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(ABC). There are, of course, other settings with respect to the NPV of the projects.
When the NPVs of projects of both types are negative, none of the banks would provide
loans to them. This is inconsistent with the equilibrium since rms (or entrepreneurs) are
necessary for production, and therefore, factor prices must adjust. When the NPVs of
projects of both types are positive, both types prefer becoming entrepreneurs regardless
of their wealth level and banks would be willing to provide loans to them. This is also
inconsistent with the equilibrium since labor is necessary for production, and thus, factor
prices must adjust.
5.5 Interest rates and the average success probability
I have already found the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs E, and the equilibrium
wage rate w. Putting these into (34) and (35) and solving for R and pe gives the
equilibrium level of risk-free interest rate, R, and the equilibrium level of the average
success probability of entrepreneurs in the economy, pe.


















I dene the following functions from (39a) and (39b):
H(R; p
















= 0 : (40b)
H(R; p
e) = 0 denes R as an implicit function of pe by taking into account only high-
type agents. Call this the high-type locus. L(R; p
e) = 0 does the same thing taking into
account only low-type agents. Call this the low-type locus. It can be shown that the
high-type locus is always downward sloping in
4
(ABC) but that the low-type locus can be
downward or upward sloping. Therefore, whenever the low-type locus is upward sloping,
an equilibrium has to be unique if one exists. The next proposition proves this formally.
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Figure 8: The Risk-free Interest Rate and the Average Success Probability
Proposition 6 (Uniqueness of R and pe) For a large class of economies (i.e., para-
meter specications), if an equilibrium exists, it is unique in R and pe.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Figure 8 illustrates high-type and low-type loci when the latter is upward sloping. In this
regime, as far as the high-type locus is concerned, more and more high-type agents would
enter into entrepreneurship when the interest rate decreases gradually. This, in and of
itself, will increase the average success probability of entrepreneurs in the economy. Going
against is the low-type locus. As far as this locus is concerned, when the interest rate
decreases gradually, more and more low-type agents would enter into entrepreneurship.
This gradually decreases the average success probability. The equilibrium occurs where
these two opposing forces meet.
Corollary 1 (Uniqueness of ) For a large class of economies (i.e., parameter speci-
cations), if a general equilibrium exists, it is dened with a unique and stable quadruple
 =(R; w; pe; E).
Proof. This result follows directly from Proposition 5 and Proposition 6.
6 Success Taxes and Wage Subsidies
This section carries out the policy analysis.28 The government cannot distinguish between
types any better than the banks can. Nonetheless, it can design policies to improve the
28For the sake of highlighting the result, the analysis below focuses on the economies characterized by
the two curves shown in Figure 8. A tax on entrepreneurs may still be desirable even when the low-type
locus is downward sloping. One case in which a tax on entrepreneurs is desirable is su¢ cient to make the
point of this paper.
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welfare, which is dened in this paper to be total expected output of the economy. The
only reason that low-type agents would like to become entrepreneurs in this model is that
the types are hidden, and thus, they may get loans with better terms than they would
have gotten if there were perfect information. This results in downward distortions in the
occupational decisions of the poor class and upward distortions in the occupational deci-
sions of the lower-middle class. These distortions negatively a¤ect who uses the capital,
and hence, prevents the economy from better outcomes. The government should design a
tax-subsidy policy that can better inform the economy about the types upon implemen-
tation. Given the information structure, this is possible only if self-selection improves in
the economy.
A policy that increases the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs in the economy is suf-
cient to increase the expected output. When pe is increasing, that means the number
of high-type entrepreneurs is increasing, too. This also means that the number of low-
type entrepreneurs is decreasing since the total number of entrepreneurs in the economy
is xed. As a result, total expected output increases. Then, the governments problem
is how to change the thresholds Ae and AL, which are endogenously determined in the
general equilibrium, in such a way that the welfare increases.
It is better for the society if a low-wealth high-type worker becomes an entrepreneur in-
stead of a high-wealth low-type entrepreneur. This is desirable not only because high-type
agents have higher success probabilities (and thus, can produce more) but also because
the supply of loanable funds to the nancial intermediation increases when that happens
(which eventually decreases the cost of loans). I shall focus on a policy in which the
government gives small wage subsidies to workers and nances them by small taxes on
entrepreneurs that are paid only in a success state. In that case, the problem to be solved




(I   A))  e Q pe(w + s) +RA (41a)
pL((w)  t  R
p
(I   A)) Q pe(w + s) +RA ; (41b)
for a high- and a low-type agent, respectively. Here, t is the tax on entrepreneurs, and s is
the wage subsidy to workers, both of which are assumed to be very small. The government
operates under a balanced budget regime, and hence, uses all of the tax revenue to nance
wage subsidies to workers. Then, the relationship between t and s is given by
s =
A
I   At : (42)
After substituting for s, (40a) and (40b) are now given by H(R; p
e; t) and L(R; p
e; t), and
thus, both high-type and low-type loci become functions of not only pe but t as well. I
start o¤ with determining the e¤ects of the tax-subsidy policy on these loci.
Proposition 7 (Policy Loci) The tax-subsidy policy shifts both high-type and low-
type loci down.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
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Corollary 2 (Policy Lending Interest Rate) The lending interest rate for every
contract decreases.
Proof. The result follows directly from Proposition 7. If both loci shift down, the risk-
free interest rate which is nothing but the cost of loanable funds must decrease. If
the cost of loanable funds decreases then lending interest rates in every wealth level must
decrease as well.
The change in the equilibrium level of the risk-free interest rate is determinate as shown
in Corollary 2. However, the change in the equilibrium level of average success probability
of entrepreneurs in the economy, pe, is ambiguous, and in general, depends on the wealth
distribution. Banerjee and Newman (1993), and Legros, Newman, and Proto (2006) show
how occupational choice and relative scarcity of entrepreneurs and workers, respectively,
can be dependent on the initial wealth distributions. Thus, the result that the policy is
contingent on the wealth distribution is not surprising. The next proposition characterizes
the cases in which the proposed policy increases the equilibrium level of pe.
Proposition 8 (Policy) There exist economies (i.e., parameter specications) in which
a small tax on entrepreneurs used to subsidize workers increases the average quality of the
entrepreneurs. This policy is welfare improving in such economies.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Figure 9 shows a case in which a tax on entrepreneurs used to subsidize workers is increas-
ing the average quality of entrepreneurs. Before the policy, equilibrium is given by the
pair (R; pe). After the policy, new loci are given by the dotted curves and the new equi-
librium occurs at (Rtax; p
e
tax). The rest of this section is devoted to provide the intuition
for this result.
Figure 9: The Tax-Subsidy Policy
Once a small tax on entrepreneurs is imposed, the total cost of starting a rm increases
for all entrepreneurs, and as shown in Corollary 2, the lending interest rate decreases.
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This means that the borrowing costs of all entrepreneurs decreases. Remember that
cross-subsidization in the credit market is the only reason that low-type agents attempt
to become entrepreneurs. After the policy, the low-type agents cannot enjoy the cross-
subsidies in the nancial markets to the same extent they had before. The policy converts
some of borrowing costs (which are subject to adverse selection) into tax costs (which are
not subject to adverse selection), and this disproportionately discourages low-type agents
from entrepreneurship.
Which low-type agents changes their decisions from entrepreneurship to wage-earning?
As shown in (26), they prefer becoming entrepreneurs when their wealth is less than AL.
In other words, they become entrepreneurs only if a su¢ ciently large portion of their
investments is nanced by banks. Thus, low-type agents who change their occupational
decisions in the margin due to a tax must be the ones who have relatively higher wealth.
They are the ones who borrow relatively less and enjoy relatively small cross-subsidies.
Once the government introduces the tax-subsidy policy they enjoy even less cross-subsidies
and some of the richer ones now prefer wage-earning over entrepreneurship.
Since the aggregate wealth is xed, the number of entrepreneurs is going to be the same
before and after the policy. Then, the question is which agents would ll the entre-
preneurship positions emptied by richer low-type agents? As shown in (25), high-type
agents provide e¤ort in entrepreneurship only if they are su¢ ciently rich (e.g., if A > Ae).
They need to pay cross-subsidies to low-type agents for the part of the investments -
nanced by their bank. A poor high-type agent cannot a¤ord to both provide e¤ort and
cross-subsidize low-type agents. Then, among the high-type agents, the ones who switch
from wage-earning to entrepreneurship in the margin are the ones who are relatively poor.
However, their low-type counterparts can also become entrepreneurs as a result of pooling
contracts in the poor class.
Figure 10: E¤ects of Changes in R and t on the Wealth Thresholds
Figure 10 illustrates a situation in which the tax-subsidy policy increases pe. An increase
in t decreases R. At the same time, both a¤ect AL and Ae. Start with the before-the-
policy thresholds Ae and AL. The e¤ects of the tax on the wealth thresholds are given
by t, and the e¤ects of changes in R on them are shown by R. Imposing a tax of t,
in and of itself, shrinks the lower-middle class by increasing Ae and decreasing AL. The




L. However, the tax
will eventually decrease R by increasing the loan supply to the banks. The change in R,





The overall change in AL is a decrease. On the right side of AL (i.e., in the upper-middle
and the rich classes) only high-type agents may become entrepreneurs due to separating
contracts. Therefore, the decrease in AL leads to greater separation by getting rid of
some low-type agents from entrepreneurship. The overall change in Ae is also a decrease.
On the left side of this threshold (i.e., in the poor class) high-type agents do not provide
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e¤ort which consequently isolates them from the loan market. Thus, anyone in this
wealth class has no chance but become workers. When Ae moves down, more high-type
agents can provide e¤ort in entrepreneurship, and thus, banks are able to o¤er loans to
them. However, their low-type counterparts can also become entrepreneurs due to pooling
contracts on the right side of Ae (i.e., in the lower-middle class).
As a result, some rich low-type entrepreneurs are swapped with an equal number of poor
low- and high-type workers. Given a xed pool of entrepreneurs, the average quality of
entrepreneurs must increase in the economy. The fact that the ones who change their
decisions from wage-earning to entrepreneurship are relatively poorer than the ones who
do the opposite is the reason why the interest rate decreases. This is one possibility in
which a tax on entrepreneurs increase the average quality of them. It should be noted that
there are other cases in which a subsidy to entrepreneurs is required to increase average
quality of them in the economy.
7 Conclusion
This paper explores the quality of entrepreneurs in an occupational choice model. The
idea I highlight is that the common partial analysis of entrepreneurship might be mis-
leading. Entrepreneurs are not merely the ones who make risky real investments or seek
loans; they also create jobs. In addition, wage-earning is the natural outside option to
entrepreneurship. A general theory of entrepreneurship should take into account all of
these interlinkages between the labor and the credit markets.
I show that, for a large class of economies, it might be desirable to tax entrepreneurs and
give the proceeds to workers. By doing so, the government can improve entrepreneurial
self-selection. The tax converts some of the cross-subsidies in the nancial intermediation
into tax revenue, which is then used to nance the wage subsidies. The overall e¤ect
of the policy is to exchange some rich low-type entrepreneurs with poor high- and low-
type workers. As a result, the average success probability of the entrepreneurs in the
economy increases. Given that the aggregate wealth in the economy is xed, this in turn
increases the total expected output of the economy. Since the agents who switch from
entrepreneurship to wage-earning are relatively wealthier than the agents who do the
opposite, the credit supply to the banking system increases. This decreases the risk-free
interest rate, which is equal to the cost of loanable funds, as well as the lending interest
rate.
It bears mentioning that the policy I propose is a pure e¢ ciency result. That is, in some
economies, e¢ ciency requires taxing entrepreneurs and giving the proceeds to workers to
improve the welfare. The policy simply changes the threshold levels for wealth classes so
as to increase the average quality of active entrepreneurs in the economy. In my view,
this pure e¢ ciency result enhances equity as well, since richer low-type entrepreneurs are
swapped with poorer high- and low-type workers as a result of the policy.
The model stresses the role of unobserved success probability in the determination of
the market outcome. This, of course, leaves out a number of other considerations that
may be important. In that sense, the practical implication of this result might not be
a tax entrepreneurs. However, as opposed to the common view in the media, it is at
least clear that subsidies to entrepreneurs may not mitigate the market failures induced
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by asymmetric information, and thus, asymmetric information, in and of itself, is not
su¢ cient to justify subsidy policies. Inci (2006) the web version of the paper discusses
some extensions.
A Appendix: Derivation of Contracts
A.1 Cross-subsidizing pooling contracts
Figure 11 illustrates the equilibrium contract o¤ers to agents with wealth levels between [0; AL].
Assume a bank o¤ers the contract C1. As can be easily seen from (14a) and (14b), the iso-prot
lines of low-type agents are steeper than those of high-type agents who provide e¤ort. The pair
of iso-prot lines for a high-type agent who provides e¤ort and for a low-type agent that pass
through the point C1 are shown in Figure 11. C1 cannot be an equilibrium since there always
exists a deviation contract C2 at the north-west of C1 that is preferable to e¤ort-providing high-
type agents but not to low-type agents. Then, any such contract can be undercut unless it is on
the Y S-axis at a point such as C3. However, since C3 is below ZPHL, it makes positive prots
with both types. Then, it cannot be an equilibrium since other banks can undercut it until
they make zero prots. This happens at C where an equilibrium is obtained. The iso-prot
lines that pass through C are denoted by HH 0 and LL0 for e¤ort-providing high-type agents
and for low-type agents, respectively. In contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitzs (1976) classic
demonstration of the impossibility of a pooling contract, there cannot be a deviation contract at
the north-west of this contract due to limited liability. Any contract outside the rst quadrant
is a pound of esh contract that require more payments than the borrower currently has.29
Figure 11: Cross-subsidizing Pooling Contracts
29"Pound of esh" is a reference to The Merchants of Venice by William Shakespeare. Bassanio gets
a loan from a merchant called Shylock. The price for not repaying is a pound of esh from his friend
Antonio, but it founders on Shylocks inability to cut out exactly a pound. I thank David de Meza for
pointing out this example to me. There may be some other non-monetary nes in cases in which the
repayment is not made. For example, before the Solonian Constitution, citizens could be sold as slaves
when they went bankrupt in Athens.
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Banks o¤er the same contract for all types and they make zero prots. E¤ort-providing high-
type agentsexpected repayment to the bank is higher than the repayment that is consistent
with their risk levels whereas it is lower for low-type agents. In that sense, e¤ort-providing
high-type agents cross-subsidize all other loan applicants due to the fact that the types are not
observable by the banks. The loan contract C(A) is preferred to outside option (RA + pew)
for every agent, and thus, all agents with these wealth levels apply for loans.
A.2 The rst-best e¢ cient separating contracts
For wealth levels in [ ~A; I], agents are rich enough that separation is possible even with a contract
designed for all. The reason is that the rich low-type agents need to borrow less, and thus, do
not benet from the cross-subsidies of the loans. Therefore, their outside option is attractive for
them even with a rst-best e¢ cient contact o¤ered in the market.
Figure 12 illustrates the equilibrium contract in these wealth levels. As before, HH
0
shows the
iso-prot line for high-type agents, LL
0
is that for low-type agents, and ZPH is the zero prot
line for banks with high-type agents. In a similar fashion to cross-subsidizing pooling contracts,
it can be shown that any contract such as C1 cannot be an equilibrium since there always exist a
deviation contract (such as C2) at the north-west of it which is preferred only by e¤ort-providing
high-type agents. This time, however, any contract in between [C; C3] is an equilibrium, since
these are not preferred by low-type agents, and they make zero prots with high-type agents who
prodide e¤ort. That means there is a continuum of equilibria. The problem now is determining
which one is a reasonable one to focus on.
Figure 12: The First-best E¢ cient Separating Contracts
It turns out that, for my purposes, it does not make any di¤erence on which equilibria I focus,
since in all of them there is no change in who becomes an entrepreneur or in the expected payment
of the loan applicants. The only di¤erence between di¤erent equilibria is the payment scheme
in both states of the world. Nonetheless, even a small degree of risk aversion would imply C
as the unique equilibrium. Thus, I can restrict my attention to C as an equilibrium contract
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Note that C(A) is e¢ cient because it can separate e¤ort-providing high-type agents from
low-type agents. Moreover, the price of the loan is such that there are no cross-subsidies.
A.3 No-e¤ort pooling contracts
The discussion of the equilibrium contracts so far neglects the point that there can be wealth
levels in which high-type agents do not provide e¤ort in entrepreneurship. They are no di¤erent
from low-type agents when they do not provide e¤ort. For such wealth levels there is no adverse
selection problem since banks can infer the success probability of any applicant, which is pL for
all agents, with certainty. I discuss the e¤ort decision in detail when I analyze the decisions of
agents. However, it bears mentioning that, in such situations, banks would o¤er the pooling

























and would make zero prots.
B Appendix: Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The equilibrium I focus on in this paper must satisfy 0 < Ae < AL < ~A < I, Assumption 4,
and AH < Ae. It can be shown that AL < ~A holds by denition, 0 < AL < ~A < I is implied
by Assumption 3, and Ae < AL implies AH < Ae. Then, it is su¢ cient to say that, in any
equilibrium I focus on, Assumption 3, Assumption 4, and 0 < Ae < AL must be satised.
Assumption 3 requires
pH(w
)  e > pew +RI ; (B.1a)
pL(w
) < pew +RI ; (B.1b)
pL(w
) > pew + (pL=p)RI : (B.1c)
0 < Ae < AL implies
p(w)  p  pL
pH   pL e > p
ew +RI ; (B.2a)
p((w)  epH pL )
I
< R : (B.2b)
Assumption 4 indicates that e > (pH   pL)w. When (B.1c), (B.2a), and (B.2b) are satised,
(B.1a) and (B.1b) are satised as well. Given w, Figure 13 shows where the possible equilibria
must lie in general equilibrium. (B.1c) says that equilibrium must lie under KK
0
, and (B.2a)
says it must lie under MM
0
, whereas (B.2b) indicates that the risk-free interest rate has to be
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Figure 13: Possible Equilibria in the General Equilibrium
above TT
0
. Then, any equilibria satisfying Assumption 3, Assumption 4, and 0 < Ae < AL must
be in
4
(ABC). Note that Assumption 4 is needed to guarantee that pL < (pLe)=[(pH   pL)w]
in Figure 13.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Note that pe 2 [pL; pH ]. I prove the uniqueness of equilibrium in two steps. First, I show that
the high-type locus is always downward sloping in pe in
4
(ABC). Second, I show that, for some
wealth distributions, the low-type locus is upward sloping in pe in
4
(ABC). In such cases, if two
loci intersects in
4
(ABC), they have to intersect only once, and thus the equilibrium must be
unique.
Step 1: High-type locus is downward sloping in pe in
4
(ABC).

























































Moreover, the right-hand side of (39a) is a function of pe only, and it is zero when pe = pL.
The left-hand side equals zero only when Ae(R;w) = I, which can happen only when R =1.
Then, the high-type locus has to be convex in pe between (pL; pH).
The number of entrepreneurs can at most be A=I. Then, theoretically, the left-hand side of
(39a) can at most be A=I. This happens when all the entrepreneur positions are lled with all
high-type agents with a positive interest rate. As far as the high-type locus is concerned, any
further decrease in R would not increase the average success probability since all the positions
have been lled by high-type entrepreneurs. Then, pe is xed and equal to pH for any interest
rate smaller than this (positive) interest rate. The high-type locus is shown in Figure 8.
Step 2: For some wealth distributions, the low-type locus is upward sloping in pe in
4
(ABC).








































=  (1  h)g(AL) pw
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(pH   pL)I  
p(1  h)w







R(p  pL) g(AL) :
(B.3)
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It is evident that for some wealth distributions @L(R; p







































The low-type locus is shown in Figure 8. In the case in which the low-type locus is upward
sloping, the two loci have to intersect once and only once.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 7













In particular, note that I do not need to take into account a change in the wage rate. It is
the same before and after the policy since neither the labor supply nor the labor demand has
changed.



















I have already shown that @H(R; p










30For some other wealth distributions @L(R; p
e)=@pe < 0, and the low-type locus is upward sloping
but a tax on entrepreneurs can still be obtained. For example, focus on a case in which there is a unique
equilibrium with an upward sloping low-type locus. Suppose the low-type locus cuts the high-type locus
from above. Then, in a similar fashion to Proposition 8, if the policy shifts down the low-type locus more




















Therefore, a tax-subsidy policy shifts the high-type locus down.



















Similarly, I have already shown that @L(R; p






















Therefore, a tax-subsidy policy shifts the low-type locus down.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Focus on the wealth distributions that satisfy Proposition 6. Let the high-type locus be RH(pe; t)
and the low-type locus be RL(pe; t). In equilibrium
RH(p
e; t) RL(pe; t) = 0 : (B.4)









On the other hand, @RH=@pe < 0 and @RL=@pe > 0. Hence, the denominator is negative. Then,





> 0 : (B.5)
Since both terms in (B.5) are negative it boils down to@RH@t
 < @RL@t
 : (B.6)
In words, if the public policy is going to increase pe, it must shift down the low-type locus more
than it shifts down the high-type locus. The expressions for these have already been derived in
40
(B.6): @RH@t



































































































> ((w)  t  e




Then, (B.7) holds if





)  epH pL ) + w
:
Note that pe < ~p is likely because the downward sloping high-type locus, RH , tends to be very
steep due to the facts that limR!1RH = 1 and limpe!pH RH is nite. I still need to check if





pL  pe  pLe
(pH   pL)w
has to be satised. Then, ~p < (pLe)=[(pH   pL)w]. Moreover, pL < ~p when
A
I   A(w







E[(pH   pL)(w)]| {z }
>e by Assumption 3
+ (1  E) [(pH   pL)w]| {z }
<e by Assumption 4
< e :
This inequality holds if E  1 E since the expression in the square brackets in the rst term
is higher than e by Assumption 3 and the one in the second term is lower than e by Assumption 4.
Therefore, this inequality hold if the number of workers in the economy is su¢ ciently larger than
the number of entrepreneurs. This completes the proof that there is a large class of economies in
which tax-subsidy policy can increase pe and, moreover, in such economies this policy is welfare
improving.
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